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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EARL RICH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.- Case No. 8671 
ERNEST ELDER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELI11INARY STATEMENT 
This is a very si1nple case. There are no law issues. 
The testimony at the trial was short (160 pages of trans-
cript). On the crucial facts the testimony of plaintiff 
and defendant was in sharp conflict. The trial Judge 
believed plaintiff and disbelieved defendant .and awarded 
judgment to plaintiff on two of his three causes of action. 
On plaintiff'.s other cause of action the trial Judge found 
plaintiff had not sustained the burden with respect to 
his claim for compensation for the use of his truck a.nd 
entered a no cause of action. 
Plaintiff does not agree with defendant's statement 
of the facts. 
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We do agree with defendant that the only two ques-
tions for review are (1) whether plaintiff \vas employed 
by defendant from approximately July 10, 1956 to July 
18, 1956 in the gathering of certain cattle; and (2) 
whether defendant was obligated to pay plaintiff !1 
$500.00 bonus on account of an earlier contract of em-
ployment. Defendant's four points, both in his statement 
of points and argument, are directed to these two propo-
sitions. We _shall meet these two points and issues in 
the order stated. 
We shall refer to respondent Rich as plaintiff, to 
appellant Elder as defendant, and to defendant Sharp 
as Sharp. 
POINT I. 
DID PLAINTIFF BECOME ENTITLED TO A $500.00 
BONUS OFFERED BY DEFENDANT IN A LETTER OF 
JANUARY 17. 1956? 
In the month of January, 1956, plaintiff, who waa 
then in the en1ploy of defendant, "~as about to quit his 
ranching and co'v punching job "~ith defendant. Defend-
ant thereupon 'vrote a letter to plaintiff (Exhibit P-1): 
'"January 17, 1956 
Dear Earl, 
Taking up "~here "~e left off today, "~hile I 
"Tas at the ranch-! think you are well able io 
assu1ne con1ple~te charge of the place. I realize 
that you might be concerned about how long the 
job "Tould last. However if it 'Yorked out like 
I think it "Tould the job "Tould be good for quite 
a long tilne. In a·n-y event I would be will1~ng to 
agree to pay you, in addition to salary-five 
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hundred dollars-if and at any time I sold the 
property. Also, as livestock prices improve, which 
I think is certain-with the politicians getting 
busy-we could consider some increase in salary. 
Realizing th.a t you could not handle· the place 
alone-I would be willing to hire Don-for $100.00 
per n1onth-to begin immediately. However, be-
fore mentioning this to Don, talk to your Dad and 
Mother about it. Also Buster and the other boys 
could have a summer job at fair pay, if they 
wanted it. If you and I reached such an .agree-
ment, I \vould want to reserve the large bedroon1 
behind the kitchen for the permanent use of my 
family-the rest of the house would be yours to 
use as you pleased. Of course, this is subject to 
the fact, that your Dad and Mother would be wel-
come to remain in the house, as long as they 
wish-the longer-the better. 
Regarding the old equipment about the place, 
I agree to your breaking it up and disposing of 
it, however, I think it would be fair to divide what-
ever you get for it-% to you-lj3 to me. 
Let me hear from you. 
Yours truly, 
Ernest Elder.'' 
Plaintiff did not answer that letter in writing, but 
shortly thereafter did meet with defendant and discussed 
the contents of the letter with him and accepted the bonus 
proposal. The conversation was .at the ranch and in con-
nection therewith plaintiff testified: 
"A. He [defendant] asked me if his proposition 
was satisfactory. 
Q. What did you say~ 
A. I told him I guess it was. Ye·s." (R. 58) 
Plaintiff thereupon ( 1) continued in the employ of 
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defendant until on or about June 15, 1956 at which time 
(2) defendant sold the r.anch. The two conditions set 
forth in this offer to pay a bonus were met and plaintiff 
became entitled to the $500.00 bonus. The trial court 
stated that it had no hesitancy in deciding this issue in 
favor of plaintiff. (R. 199) 
Now what does defendant say about the bonus in his 
brief~ Under point III .at page 13 of his brief defendant 
says the "only evidence concerning a bonus which wa~ 
presented by plaintiff was the letter of January 17, 1956n 
(Exhibit P-1) and he says further that at no time did 
plaintiff "eve-r indicate that he would accept the term~ 
and conditions of the letter." Either counsel for defend-
ant f.ailed to read the record or failed to understand it 
as the quotation from the record page 58 hereinabove 
set forth fully demonstrates. Plaintiff did accept the 
terms and conditions of the bonus offer of January 17, 
1956. 
Defendant urges, however, that there were two fur-
ther unwritten conditions attaching to the bonus offer: 
(1) Defendant says he or.ally told plaintiff that the 
bonus would be paid only if plaintiff "~as not hired by 
the person to whom defendant nright sell the ranch. This 
condition was not in1posed b3r tern1s of the letter of 
.January 17, 1956. After hearing the testimony the trial 
court found that this condition 'vas not imposed by de-
fendant (Findings of Fact, Third Cause of Action). 
(2) Defendant says there was also the condition 
that plaintiff n1ust render faithful, loyal and expert 
HPrvices in or.der to beco1ne entitled to the bonus. (Brief, 
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page 5) These specific conditions were not imposed by 
the letter of January 17, 1956. The court also found that 
they were not specifically imposed. (Findings of Fact, 
Third Cause of Action) We have no particular quarrel 
with the c.ases cited by defendant or with the· law that 
there is an implied condition that an employee should 
render his services with reasonable diligence and effi-
ciency. But, there is no evidence whatsoever that plain-
tiff failed to render reasonably good services to defend-
ant. Plaintiff kept records of the cattle (R. 122, 123), 
reported weekly to defendant (R. 124), and defendant 
admits he was so informed (R. 152) and that plaintiff 
rendered valuable services for him. 
Defendant apparently fails to realize the dilemma 
in which he finds himself: He contends on the one hand 
that plaintiff is not entitled to the bonus because of lack 
of performance of good services from January 17, 1956 
to June 15, 1956. But, on the other hand during said 
period of time defendant paid to plaintiff, plaintiff's 
regular monthly wage without any complaint or intima-
tion of lack of performance of reasonably good services. 
The same services which earned for plaintiff his regular 
monthly wage during this period entitled him to the 
bonus. 
Defendant complain.s that after plaintiff ceased to 
work for him and after defendant and Sharp came into 
conflict that plaintiff was disloyal in failing to sign a 
certain affidavit to be dictated by Mr. King which plain-
tiff interpreted to be· a sort of guar,antee or assurance 
with respect to the number of cattle on the open range 
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In the spring of 1956. (R. 137-141) Defendant offered 
plaintiff $200.00 if he would sign this document. Plaintiff 
refused. Neither plaintiff nor any other p·erson could 
honestly sign any such document. Inasmuch as th•: 
cattle were not gathered and counted in the spring of 
1956 that data was unavailable. Plaintiff did, however~ 
orally give his opinion as to the number of cattle that 
might or could have been on the open range in the spring 
of 1956 (R. 136) and did inform defendant's attorney 
that if an affidavit were prepared and sent to plaintiff~ 
plaintiff would have his own attorney go over the same 
and if it were acceptable that the same would be signed. 
(R. 142-143) Defendant's attorney never did prepare 
or submit such an affidavit. 
This so called "lack of loyalty,'' ex post facto, could 
have no bearing on the issue of plaintiffs right to the 
bonus. That right either n1aterialized or failed on June 
15, 1956 and the decision of plaintiff not to become em-
broiled in the cattle dispute bet,Yeen defendant and Sharp 
can have no bearing on his right to the bonus. Moreover, 
it would appear quite unlil{ely that defendant would 
stress loyalty as a condition of defendant's en1ployment 
in Jan nary of 1956 at 'vhich tune there \Yas no contract or 
eonflirt bet,veen defendant and. Sharp. Obvious!~~ this 
~tress upon loyalty a.s a condition precedent to plain-
tifT's right to the bonus is son1ething \Yhich oecurred to 
defendant after he and Sharp cru11e to blo\YS. See the 
testiinon~'" of defendant in this connection. (R. 178 et seq.) 
On or about July 26, 1956 plaintiff "Torked two or 
three days for Sharp in the gathering and re1noval of 
ecrtain cattle. Plaintiff was not then employed by de-
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fendant and had no obligation, moral or otherwise, to 
t~e cattle. Defendant makes the wild and unsupported 
iscuss with--defendant the gathering ,and- removal ol) ....._ _________ - --- ~-
statement that plaintiff "concealed" from defendant the 
fact that Sharp removed these cattle from the range 
on or about July 26, 1956. (Observe that this date is after 
the cattle were turned over to Sharp and was after plain-
tiff ceased to work for defendant.) But, the record does 
not support this statement and on the contrary plain-
tiff in answer to a question put by defendant's counsel 
replied: (R. 135) 
"Q. l\fr. Rich, did you tell me at that time that 
you had participated in the removal of two 
loads of cattle from the range~ 
_._~. I did not. You didn't ask me. 
Q. I asked you something else though didn't I~ I 
asked you how many cattle there were in the 
spring of 1956 didn't I~ 
A. And I didn't know. 
Q. You said you didn't know~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. But you gave us an estimate at that time 
didn't you, Mr. Rich~ 
A. I did." 
Defendant devotes considerable space to the argu-
ment that when defendant paid plaintiff shortly after 
June 15, 1956 for his regular salary that plaintiff did not 
ask for the bonus and that he was paid in full for services 
rendered up until that time. Plaintiff was informed even 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
after the sale was effected that no sale had \been made 
and it is, ther.efore, understandable why he did not then 
ask for the bonus. 
Defendant deliberately and falsely lead plaintiff to 
believe that although he had sold the cattle that he was 
retaining the ranch and that he and Sharp were merely 
combining their operations and therefore plaintiff was 
not entitled to the bonus because the ranch had not been 
sold: 
"A. [By Plaintiff] I don't know who told me, but 
I thought that Mr. Sharp was out there to 
take over the management of the ranch. I 
~sked Mr. Elder something to that effect and~ 
if he was, and he said no. That it wasn't like 
that. Told me that Mr. Sharp had a feed 
lot in Delta and that he "~as trying to swing 
a deal with him to more or less combine the 
ranches and the feed lot ; to better advantage 
I guess." ( R. 60) 
It is apparent that defendant believed that if he 
could mis-inform plaintiff concernin~ the status of the 
ranch sale that defendant Inight in some n1a1mer avoid 
paying the pro1nised bonus. Even as late as August of 
1956 when plaintiff called at the ho1ne of defendant in 
Salt Lake City plaintiff again asked defendant whether 
he w.as "clear out of it, of the ranch~, to "rhich defendant 
said "no, that he still had his interest there." (R. 61) 
Defendant himself volunteered that perhaps plaintiff 
didn't understand that the ranch had been sold. (R. 182) 
Pla.i ntiff again asked about the bonus during the con-
ferPneP \Vith defendant at the la"~ office of )fr. King. (R. 
188) 
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The testimony of plaintiff is confirmed by the testi-
nlony of Sharp : ( R. 97) 
"A. Well the first Mr. Elder told me that he, that 
Mr. Rich had been concerned about his job if 
he .sold the place and that he'd agreed to take 
care of him. Asked if it was all right if he 
[defendant] told him [plaintiff] th.at I had 
my feed yard in Delta and we figured the 
two operations to go together would be a 
benefit to both of us, but I was going to be 
in full charge of the whole affair. I would 
manage both places and were just putting a 
feed yard and r.anch together, that I'd bought 
the cattle. 
Q. Well that wasn't the fact was it~ 
A. No. 
Q. And he asked you if it was all right if he 
could tell Mr. Rich that~ 
A. Yes." 
Defendant asserts that plaintiff "never. made any 
clai1n for the bonus prior to the time of the filing of th~ 
complaint" (Brief, page 14). The record discloses that 
plaintiff did inquire concerning the sale and the bonus 
on more than one occasion prior to the time of the filing 
of the complaint and on each instance he was deliberate-
ly mis-informed by defendant to the effect that no sale 
had been made and that defendant and Sharp were mere~ 
ly combining their operations. It was in light of this 
background of wilful! mis-information given by defend-
ant that plaintiff accepted his pay on or about June 15, 
1956 without at that time receiving the bonus settlem.ent. 
On the entire case it is not difficult to understand 
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why the trial Judge believed plaintiff and Sharp as 
against defendant Elder in light of defendant's deliberate 
mis-statements as well as in light of his contradictory 
statements. (See the cross-examination of defendant, (R. 
176-189) 
POINT II. 
WAS PLAINTIFF EMPLOYED BY DEFENDANT FROl\1 
APPRO·XIMATELY JULY 10, 1956 TO JULY 18, 1956 IN 
THE GATHERING OF CERTAIN CATTLE? 
Defendant in his brief asserts (1) that plaintiff 
failed to show a contract of employment between plaintiff 
and defendant for the gathering of the cattle, and (2) 
that there was no consider:ation to the defendant for th8 
promise to pay the cost of the gathering. (Brief, page 6) 
Defendant then quotes certain portions of the record and 
says that the evidence in support of plaintiff's position 
"comes only fron1 the mouths of plaintiff and Sharp.'· 
(Brief, page 7) ,, ... e adn1it that there is a conflict between 
plaintiff :and Sharp on the one hand and defendant on the 
other. The trial Judge, ho,veYer, believed the for1ner 
and disbelieved the latter. 
(1) 
Both plaintiff and Sharp categorically state that 
defendant told plaintiff that defendant \VOUld pay the 
cost of gathering the cattle. 
Plaintiff teBtified: (R. 6~) 
''(~. All right, "That else was said'? 
A. ·As I re1ne1nber it, 1\fr. Sharp con1e in then 
and he said "Then they go to the 1nountain to 
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gather the cows they ar.e working for you 
[defendant] then. Mr. Elder said yes." . 
Plaintiff on cross-examination testified concerning 
a telephone conversation placed between him and de-
fendant on or about July 4, 1956: (R. 66) 
''Q. Well this call that you made novv, Mr. Rich, 
you were in doubt as to whether or not you 
had any authority to hire anybody on behalf 
of Mr. Elder or authority to charge any 
groceries to his account or act in any way on 
his behalf didn't you~ 
A. I was not. 
Q. You just, well then why were you calling him 
from Wellington to Salt L:ake City if you had 
no doubt about your authority~ 
A. To get him to confirm my authority to do it. 
Once more. 
Q. Once more, is that right~ 
A. Yes." 
As counsel for plaintiff admits, the testimony of 
plaintiff on this point is confirmed by the testimony of 
Sharp. Concerning the conversation at the ranch a few 
days following June 15, 1956, Sharp testified as follows: 
(R. 95) 
"A. A few days after the 15th he [defendant] told 
Mr. Rich tha.t I was in charge and would pay 
them from June, 15th on. And we had to get 
the hay up, and as soon as the hay was fin-
ished that he was going back to work for him 
to gather the cattle. 
Q. Now that's what he told Mr. Rich~ 
A. Yes. Then they went ahead with some other 
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business, and as we left I repeated again to 
Mr. Rich, well you're all working for me. 
Q. Was Mr. Elder there when you repeated it~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you say~ 
A. I said, 'Fellows you're working for me dur-
ing the hay and you go back to work for lvfr. 
Elder on the, when the cattle count starts.' 
Q. What did Elder say~ 
A. O.K. Said yes." 
The trial Judge believed the testimony of plaintiff 
and Sharp. The evidence is substantial and is contra-
dicted only by defendant himself. 
(2) 
There is absolutely no merit to the contention of 
defendant that there "~as no consideration to hin1 for his 
promise to pay for the gathering of the cattle. If I 
understand defendant's .argmnent it is that his contract 
'vith Sharp did not require hin1 to gather the cattle and 
therefore even though he did ask the plaintiff to gather 
these cattle and even though he did agree to pay for the 
gathering that there 'vas no consideration for the promise 
to pay. To 1uerely state this argu1nent is to den1onstrate 
its fallacy. \'1hether defendant "~as obliged under his 
eontract 'vith Sharp to gathPr the cattle on the range is 
,vholly inunaterial in so far as his obligation to pay plain-
t i.ff for the gathering is concerned. The record clearly 
nstablishes and the court found that defendant requested 
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plaintiff to gather the cattle, that he agreed to pay him 
for the services rendered .and that plaintiff did gather the 
cattle. Most certainly it is no defense to an action on 
that promise to pay for defendant to now say that as 
bet\veen defendant and Sharp he had no obligation to 
gather the cattle. 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THERALDN. JENSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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